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Abstract: In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of  Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that 
it is not a conceptual truth that laws of  nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a 
metaphysical account of  laws that makes sense of  their governing role. I agree with the first point 
but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows 
straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of  scientific theory 
choice combined with a highly plausible claim about the connection between scientific theory 
choice and theory choice in metaphysics. I present and defend this argument and then show how 
the resulting understanding of  governance gives rise to an especially strong version of  recent 
explanatory circularity arguments against Humeanism about laws of  nature. Finally, I present 
three options for a further understanding of  the governance relation that are compatible with my 
argument.
Introduction
According to the governing conception of  laws, laws of  nature are not mere summaries of  
particular matters of  fact. Instead they govern, or determine (in some metaphysically robust sense 
of  ‘determine’) what the particular matters of  fact are. On the governing conception of  laws, 
laws “do something—they govern what goes on in the universe” (Beebee 2000, p. 580). Laws that 
govern are “entities that produce or govern and thereby explain the evolution of  events” (Loewer 
2012, p. 118); they are “responsible for (i.e., produce, necessitate, etc.) the regularities exhibited in 
nature” (Hildebrand 2019, p. 3).
In her influential paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of  Laws,” Helen Beebee 
(2000) argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of  nature govern. Therefore, she says, 
one need not insist on a metaphysical account of  laws that makes sense of  their governing role. I 
agree with the first point but not the second. For although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact 
that laws govern follows straightforwardly from the combination of  an important (though under-
appreciated) principle of  scientific theory choice with the highly plausible claim that the 
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principles of  scientific theory choice ought to constrain theory choice in metaphysics. In what 
follows, I present and defend this argument and show how it is compatible with several ways of  
understanding the governance relation itself.
There are two important upshots of  this argument for our thinking about laws of  nature. 
The first is that the default position for those philosophers who wish to be scientifically 
respectable in their metaphysical theorizing should be to endorse the governing conception of  
laws. The second is that being a Humean about laws of  nature is significantly harder than is 
usually thought.  Anyone who wishes to remain a Humean in light of  this argument must either 
(i) accept some fairly surprising claims about the relationship between science and metaphysics, 
(ii) justify a fairly robust reinterpretation of  standard scientific practice and the historical 
examples that support my claims about that practice, or (iii) accept some fairly unintuitive claims 
about the nature of  explanation. Any of  these consequences is surprising and substantive enough 
that they should move a would-be Humean to revisit the initial motivation for their view—is 
Humeanism truly so attractive, are its benefits truly so impressive, that they warrant these 
consequences?
In addition to these domain-specific upshots, the argument demonstrates and defends a 
more general methodological point, which stands as a challenge not just to Humeans, but to all 
of  us who wish to be scientifically-respectable in our philosophical theorizing. Being scientifically 
respectable is not just a matter of  making sure that the commitments of  one’s favored 
philosophical theory do not conflict with the content of  our best scientific theories. In addition, we 
need to pay attention to the principles that play a role in scientific theory choice. And the way in 
which those principles impact various philosophical debates is often surprising. 
Here is a plan for what follows. In sections 1 and 2, I show how a certain principle 
constrains theory choice in physics. In section 3, I argue that, given that that principle constrains 
theory choice in physics, it ought to constrain theory choice in metaphysics as well. In section 4,  I 
show how the principle in question has an important general consequence for one’s metaphysics 
of  laws: it requires a governing conception of  laws. In section 5, I show how this general 
consequence affects the debate between Humeans and non-Humeans about laws of  nature. In 
section 6, I lay out several accounts of  governance itself  that are compatible with the argument in 
sections 1-4. I close, in section 7, with some thoughts about how this type of  argument 
demonstrates that being scientifically-respectable in our philosophical theorizing is not as 
straightforward as many philosophers seem to think, and with some suggestions for how all of  us, 
regardless of  our particular commitments regarding, for instance, the metaphysics of  laws, ought 
to proceed when evaluating metaphysical theories with an eye toward their coherence with our 
best science.
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1 The pattern-explanation principle
In this section I will argue that a certain principle—I will call it the pattern-explanation principle—
constrains theory choice in physics. The rough idea behind the pattern-explanation principle is 
that one of  the most serious flaws that a scientific theory can have is to leave a well-established 
pattern unexplained. Indeed, even if  the only way in which one can explain some well-
established pattern is to introduce a type of  entity that is metaphysically weird or novel, it is 
worth the cost of  introducing such entities. 
More formally, here is the initial version of  the principle:
The pattern-explanation principle — initial version. We ought not leave a well-established 
pattern unexplained, even if  they only way to explain that pattern is to introduce 
some type of  entity that is metaphysically weird or novel.
I have defended versions of  the pattern-explanation principle before (Emery 2017 and 
Emery 2018), and for my own part I take this principle to be a fairly obvious component of  
scientific theory choice. But since, as I will show below, the principle has fairly significant 
consequences for contemporary metaphysics, a more detailed defense is warranted. In what 
follows, then, I will argue for the pattern-explanation principle by examining three historical 
cases of  scientific theory choice in which metaphysically weird or novel entities were introduced. 
A natural reading of  each of  these cases suggests that the reason why these entities were 
introduced was that otherwise a well-established pattern in the data would go unexplained. At the 
very least, then, these examples, taken together, put the burden clearly on those who wish to deny 
the pattern-explanation principle to articulate an alternative story about what is going on in each 
of  these cases.
Here is the first example. In the early 20th century, experimental physicists observed that 
energy and momentum appeared to be lost during a certain type of  radioactive decay, called beta 
decay. The total energy and momentum of  the observed particles before the decay was not equal 
to the total energy and momentum of  the observed particles after the decay. This pattern was 
surprising—it appeared to be a violation of  the conservation of  energy and of  momentum—but 
by the late 1920s it was well established in the data. 
In 1930, Wolfgang Pauli suggested that the explanation for this apparent loss of  energy 
was that the particles that scientists observed after the decay were not in fact all of  the particles 
that were produced.1 There was, in addition, a theretofore unobserved particle—the neutrino—
1 See Pauli’s open letter to the December 1930 group meeting in Tübingen, reprinted in Physics Today 31: 9 (1978). In 
this letter, Pauli referred to the unobserved particle that he postulated as the “neutron”. Enrico Fermi later 
introduced the name “neutrino”.
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that was produced by beta decay, and the energy and momentum of  the neutrino that was 
produced was such that once it was included, energy and momentum were conserved
Pauli’s hypothesis was initially controversial—Pauli himself  called it a “desperate 
remedy.” Why was this? For all that has been said so far, several factors may have been at play. 
For one thing, there was no direct experimental evidence for the existence of  neutrinos. For 
another, neutrinos are strange in several ways. They were thought to be massless,2 to have no 
charge, and to barely interact with other particles. As Laurie M. Brown, a physicist and historian 
of  physics writes, when Pauli first proposed the neutrino, “any other elementary constituent 
[besides the proton and electron] of  the atom would have been considered superfluous, and to 
imagine that another might exist was abhorrent to the prevailing natural philosophy” (Brown 1978, 
my emphasis).
When Pauli first suggested his hypothesis, there was also an alternative explanation of  the 
apparent energy and momentum loss in beta decay. This alternative hypothesis, which had been 
proposed by Niels Bohr, was that the conservation of  energy and the conservation of  momentum 
were probabilistic laws similar to the second law of  thermodynamics.3  Although these principles 
were very likely to hold in most scenarios, there was at least some probability of  their being 
violated. Bohr’s suggestion was that the way in which these violations occurred were such that we 
should expect the observed energy loss beta decay.
However controversial Pauli’s proposal was initially, by the mid-1930s, the neutrino had 
gained widespread acceptance.4 What had changed in the intervening years? It was still the case 
that there was no direct experimental evidence for the existence of  neutrinos.5 And it was still the 
case that neutrinos were weird and surprising in the ways described above. Instead the key 
development seems to have been that in 1933 there were new experimental results that showed 
that Bohr’s alternative explanation for the apparent energy loss in beta decay was not viable.6 
2 Experiments in the late 1990s showed that neutrinos in fact have non-zero mass.
3 See the discussion in Brown 1978.
4 Pauli himself  seems to wavered with respect to how plausible he found his own hypothesis between 1931 and the 
fall of  1933. His remarks at the Seventh Solvay Conference in October 1933 seem to mark the turning point at 
which is fully confident. See Brown 1978, which includes a translation of  Pauli’s 1933 remarks.
5 Direct experimental evidence would not be obtained until the Cowen-Reines experiment in 1956.
6 These experimental results were due to Charles Drummond Ellis and Nevill Mott who showed, in mid-1933, that 
the beta-ray spectrum has a sharp upper limit. See the description and citations in Brown 1978.
Another important development that happened around this time is that in 1934 Enrico Fermi published a 
quantitative theory of  beta decay built around the neutrino. (See Wilson 1986, which contains an English translation 
of  Fermi’s 1934 paper, which was published in German in Zeitschrift für Physik.) In conversation I have sometimes had 
philosophers of  science suggest that it was Fermi’s development of  this theory, as opposed to the ruling out of  Bohr’s 
alternative hypothesis, that made the neutrino acceptable to physicists. My reading is that what Fermi’s theory did 
was show that Pauli’s hypothesis could in fact do the explanatory work for which it was designed, and thus the 
suggestion that Fermi’s theory was an important step in the acceptability of  the neutrino is not in conflict with the 
pattern explanation principle. For what it is worth, there is also an oft-repeated anecdote about Fermi’s paper, 
according to which it was initially rejected by Nature because “it contained speculations too remote from reality to be 
of  interest to the reader” (see Pais 1986 p. 418 and Close 2012, p. 24). This suggests that Fermi’s development of  the 
theory itself  was not enough to make the neutrino acceptable. 
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That scientists’ attitudes toward the neutrino would change dramatically after these new 
experimental results ruled out Bohr’s alternative explanation (even though little else had 
changed), would, of  course, make perfect sense if  the pattern-explanation principle was a 
constraint on theory choice in fundamental physics. Neutrinos may have been strange, and the 
evidence for them indirect, but once scientists needed them in order to explain the pattern of  
apparent energy and momentum loss in beta decay, they were accepted.
In this particular case, one might make the claim that the sort of  entity being introduced, 
however strange, was still in some sense a member of  a group of  entities that was already 
accepted by physicists—however unusual a particle, the neutrino was still a particle. But other 
examples show that when faced with a well-established pattern that would otherwise go 
unexplained, physicists are also willing to introduce entities that are largely or even wholly novel. 
The physicists introducing these entities may have hypotheses about what they are, but they 
admit that these hypotheses are tentative and likely to be overturned. What they seem to be sure 
of  is that there is something that explains the pattern in question, whatever sort of  thing it turns out 
to be.
Along these lines, consider a second historical example: the electromagnetic field as 
introduced by Faraday in 1852 and further developed by Thomson and Maxwell in the later half  
of  the 19th century. Previously, physicists observing various kinds of  electromagnetic phenomena 
had thought that such phenomena had to be explained by some kind of  action at a distance, 
similar to the way that, at the time, gravitational phenomena was thought to be explained. But 
Faraday had experimental evidence that he thought suggested that electromagnetic phenomena 
were importantly different than gravitational phenomena, and that showed that the former were 
not apt for explanation by action at a distance.7 (In particular Faraday was moved by the 
observation that electromagnetic forces were exerted along curved lines, and by the fact that at 
least some electromagnetic forces were affected by the medium between the object exerting the 
force and the object that the force was acting on.) Instead, Faraday suggested, electromagnetic 
phenomena must be explained by an electromagnetic field.
What was an electromagnetic field? Faraday himself  put forward two different hypotheses 
about how it might be understood. According to one, the space between the object exerting the 
magnetic force and the object upon which the force was acting was permeated by an ether of  
contiguous, unobservable particles which transmitted the force from the acting object to the 
object being acted upon. According to the other, there were physical lines of  force which existed 
independently of  any particles and which connected the acting object to the object being acted 
upon.8 Maxwell, meanwhile suggested that the electromagnetic field should be understood as a 
fluid filled with vortex tubes, where the arrangement of  the tubes corresponded to the direction 
of  the lines of  the field and the angular momentum of  the tubes corresponded to the intensity of  
7 See Faraday 1852, especially pp. 413 - 417;  Maxwell 1861; and Hesse 1962, especially chapter 8.
8 The discussion in Harman 1982, p. 78 is especially helpful in understanding these proposals.
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the field.9 
Both Faraday and Maxwell, however, were insistent that their accounts of  the 
electromagnetic field were tentative at best. And certainly on any of  these accounts, the 
electromagnetic field was a novel entity, and one whose metaphysical nature was not clearly 
understood. To posit such an entity was surely metaphysically costly—these physicists would have 
avoided it if  they could. Nonetheless Faraday and those who followed him seemed to be 
convinced that there had to be something that explained electromagnetic phenomena, and given 
that it could not be accounted for in terms of  any other, previously accepted entities, they were, 
however reluctantly, willing to introduce something wholly novel. Again this would make sense if  
the pattern explanation principle constrained theory choice in physics.
Nor is the case of  the electromagnetic field a historical anomaly. If  anything the point is 
even more vividly illustrated by a final, contemporary example. In the late 1990s, observations 
from the Hubble Telescope showed that the rate at which the universe is expanding is 
accelerating. According to the NASA Science website “No one expected this, no one knew how to 
explain it. But something was causing it.” Indeed the site goes on to say,
“Theorists still don't know what the correct explanation is, but they have given the 
solution a name. It is called dark energy. What is dark energy? More is unknown 
than is known. We know how much dark energy there is because we know how it 
affects the universe's expansion. Other than that, it is a complete mystery.”10
Here again we have the introduction of  an entity that is weird—in this case an entity 
about which scientists know almost nothing—because without that entity there would be no 
explanation available for a well-established pattern in the data. In this case, theorists admit that 
they don’t have much of  an idea at all as to what dark energy is. They have hypotheses, of  
course, of  one sort or the other. But any such hypotheses are tentative at best. What scientists 
seem to be convinced of  is that there is something that explains the accelerating rate of  
expansion of  the universe, and they use the name ‘dark energy’ to pick out that thing, whatever it 
9 Harman 1982, p. 89. There is some controversy over how serious Maxwell was being when he proposed this 
account of  the electromagnetic field in terms of  vortex tubes. He sometimes said explicitly that this account was 
merely supposed to be illustrative or suggestive. But he was also explicit that the data he had collected required some 
kind of  explanation. See the discussion in Harman ibid, especially p. 92. 
10 “Dark Energy, Dark Matter”, Nasa Science, https://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/what-is-dark-energy. 
See also Carroll 2007, lectures 14 - 17. Note that I am using the term ‘dark energy’ in an expansive sense that 
include the possibility that dark energy just is the vacuum energy (or Einstein’s cosmological constant). This seems to 
be relatively standard both in early discussion of  dark energy (e.g. Turner 2001; n.b. Turner is often credited with 
coining the term ‘dark energy’) and in more recent summary discussions (e.g. Carroll 2007), but note that some may 
prefer to reserve the term ‘dark energy’ for those hypotheses that would provide a dynamical explanation that is 
distinct from the vacuum energy hypothesis. My reading of  the literature (supported by the citations above) there is 
not a consensus regarding the existence of  dark energy if  the term is being used in this more restrictive, dynamical 
sense.
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is. Yet again, we see here an attitude would make perfect sense if  the pattern-explanation 
principle constrained scientific theory choice.
The thing that all of  these examples have in common is that they involve the introduction 
of  entities that are or were (at the time at which they were accepted) metaphysically weird or 
novel (or both). As such, the acceptance of  these entities was a serious cost of  the theory in which 
they appeared. Nonetheless, that cost was considered worth paying. Why? A highly plausible 
answer, especially when these cases are taken together as a group is: Because without such 
entities, well-established patterns in the data would go unexplained. 
These are, of  course, only three examples, and there is far more historical and scientific 
nuance in each case than I have been able to develop here. I am not claiming, therefore, that 
these examples prove anything decisive. But taken together these examples are at least highly 
suggestive. The burden is on those who want to reject the pattern-explanation principle to come 
up with new examples, or a reinterpretation of  these examples, that supports their alternative 
view.
2 Pattern-explanation as metaphysically robust explanation
The three examples above give us good reason to think that the pattern explanation principle 
constrains scientific theory choice. The reader will notice, however, that I have said nothing so far 
about the notion of  explanation that is at play in the pattern explanation principle. And given 
how multi-faceted the notion of  explanation is, we need to say at least something more about that 
notion if  the principle is going to have any substance. 
Consider, for instance, the following four ways in which we naturally use the word 
‘explains’.
We say that A explains B when A provides us with some understanding of  B.
We say that A explains B when A shows how B is part of  a broader pattern of  
phenomena.
We say that A explains B when A causes B.
We say that A explains B when A grounds B.11
11 I do not claim that this list is exhaustive. I take the idea that explain involves showing how an event fits into a 
broader pattern to capture the central idea behind a unification account of  explanation, though I’m in principle 
open to there being a notion of  explanation as unification that goes beyond pattern subsumption. See the next 
footnote for more.
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These ways of  using the word ‘explains’ are fairly heterogenous, spanning notions that are 
relatively metaphysically thin and largely subjective, like the notion of  understanding for creatures like 
us, to notions that are metaphysically substantive and seemingly objective, like causal relations 
and grounding relations.
I think it would be a mistake to argue about which of  these ways of  talking captures the 
correct notion of  explanation. Certainly in the case at hand we need not engage in anything so 
contentious. Instead we should focus on the question of  what notion of  explanation is at play in 
the pattern explanation principle. Insofar as a well-established pattern gives rise to an 
explanatory burden, what sort of  explanation is required in order to discharge that burden?
In order to answer this question we can look again at the historical examples discussed 
above. Although these examples don’t seem to support a definitive, singular reading of  the notion 
of  explanation at play in the pattern explanation principle, they do give us some insight into that 
notion. Here, for instance, is a fairly obvious point: the key feature of  all three of  those examples 
was that the entities that were introduced in order to explain the pattern in question were 
metaphysically weird or novel or both; as a result, those entities cannot have been said to do 
much by way of  providing us with any further understanding of  the phenomena in question. 
Something other than mere understanding must be required in order to discharge the 
explanatory burden that these patterns create.
More generally, I claim that the historical examples discussed in the previous section give 
us good reason to think that when we are faced with a well-established pattern in the data, what 
we require is what I will call a metaphysically robust explanation—an explanation in which the 
explanans identifies the reason why the explanandum occurred. Paradigm cases of  metaphysically 
robust explanations are explanations that identify the cause or the ground of  the explanans. 
Understanding, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient for a metaphysically robust 
explanation—sometimes the reason why something occurs is beyond our understanding and 
sometimes our understanding can lead us astray with respect to the reason why something 
occurs. (I will say something more about the fourth kind of  explanation mentioned above—
pattern subsumption—in a moment.)
My claim, then, is that the three examples discussed above do more than just support the 
initial version of  the pattern-explanation principle. They also support the following version of  
that principle:
The pattern-explanation principle — final version. We ought not leave a well-established 
pattern without a metaphysically robust explanation, even if  they only way to give 
a metaphysically robust explanation of  that pattern is to introduce a type of  entity 
that is metaphysically weird or novel.
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I find the notion of  metaphysically robust explanation to be useful and thus find this way 
of  phrasing the pattern-explanation principle to be illuminating. But I want to emphasize that the 
role that the metaphysical robustness of  an explanation plays in my argument is only the role of  a 
methodological shortcut. The key claim that I am making here is that the notion of  explanation 
at play in the pattern explanation principle should be determined by the examples that give us 
reason to endorse that principle in the first place. Suppose that we observe some well-established 
pattern, and someone tries to say that an explanation of  type E is sufficient to explain that 
pattern. What I have suggested above is that a good way of  testing whether an explanation of  
type E is in fact sufficient is to ask whether explanations of  type E are metaphysically robust—
whether they identify the reason why the explanandum occurred. But insofar as one finds the 
questions about the metaphysical robustness of  an explanation confused or otherwise difficult to 
adjudicate, one can skip it entirely and instead ask: would an explanation of  type E have been 
sufficient to explain the observed patterns in the examples discussed in section 1? If  not, then 
explanations of  type E are not sufficient to explain the pattern in question in the sense of  
explanation that is at play in the pattern explanation principle.
Here is an example. (One that is relevant to the discussion of  Humean accounts of  laws 
of  nature in section 4.) Suppose one observes a bunch of  Fs, all of  which are G, and suppose one 
tries to explain that pattern by claiming that all Fs are G. This corresponds to a pattern 
subsumption account of  explanation according to which if  A shows how B fits into a broader 
pattern then A explains B.12 
Are pattern subsumption explanations metaphysically robust? If  A shows how B fits into a 
larger pattern, does A thereby identify the reason why B? I think the answer to this question is 
pretty clearly no. We can show how an event fits into a broader pattern of  events without thereby 
identifying the reason why that even occurred. But we need not rely on this claim. We can 
consider instead the question of  whether pattern subsumption would have been sufficient to 
explain the sorts of  examples that gave us reason for endorsing the pattern explanation constraint 
to begin with.
Consider, for instance, the fact that in all of  our observations the rate of  expansion of  the 
universe is accelerating. Here are two ways of  trying to explain that pattern. First, one could 
introduce an entity as strange and poorly understood as dark energy. Second, one could simply 
claim that the rate of  expansion of  the universe is always accelerating. Surely if  the second route 
had been a viable way of  discharging the explanatory burden created by our observations, 
12 The idea that Humean laws might explain by way of  pattern subsumption is discussed in  Bhogal ms. Sometimes 
Humeans claim that laws explain by unifying without giving the kind of  detailed account that Bhogal gives (see, e.g. 
Loewer 1996), which of  course leaves open the possibility that these other Humeans have some alternative account 
of  explanation as unification in mind. That is fine. I am not arguing here that Humeans  laws cannot explain. My 
argument is just that in order to do so, they need to give an account on which laws provide metaphysically robust 
explanations in the sense required by the examples in section 1. If  the Humean can accomplish this by making use 
of  some version of  the unificationist account of  explanation, that doesn’t undermine my argument. (It will mean, 
however, that the Humean must face the circularity worries described in section 4.)
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scientists would have taken it. But they didn’t. This indicates that mere pattern subsumption is 
not sufficient to discharge the explanatory burden created by a well-established pattern.
Note that nothing that I have said here rules out the possibility that there are genuine 
explanations that are not metaphysically robust. I am happy to agree that explanations that 
merely facilitate understanding or subsume some phenomena under a broader pattern are 
genuine explanations. What I am claiming is that insofar as there are non-metaphysically-robust 
explanations, they are not sufficient to discharge the explanatory burden created by a well-
established pattern. When one observes such a pattern, one is pushed to identify the reason why 
the pattern occurs. Indeed the explanatory burden generated by such patterns is so substantial 
that it warrants the introduction of  metaphysically weird or novel entities in order to establish 
that there is some reason why that pattern occurs, even if, all else being equal, we would prefer to 
keep such entities out of  our metaphysics.
3 From physics to metaphysics
So far, I have argued that the pattern-explanation principle constrains theory choice in physics. In 
this section I will argue that if  the pattern-explanation principle constrains theory choice in 
physics, then it ought to be a constraint on theory choice in metaphysics as well.
The argument here is straightforward. Notice first that there is a widespread consensus 
among contemporary metaphysicians that the content of  our best scientific theories ought to 
constrain theory choice in metaphysics. But one can have no good reason for thinking that the 
content of  our best scientific theories should constrain theory choice in metaphysics if  one does not 
also think that standard scientific practice constrains theory choice in metaphysics as well. Insofar 
as one thinks that standard scientific practice functions via principles that do not track the facts 
about the world that metaphysicians are interested in, then why would one think that the content 
of  the scientific theories produced by that methodology should have any bearing on our 
metaphysical theorizing?
It follows that if  one agrees with the widespread consensus that the content of  our best 
scientific theories ought to constrain theory choice in metaphysics, then one ought to think that 
the principles that constrain theory choice in fundamental physics ought to constrain theory 
choice in metaphysics as well. This conditional claim is, I think, already strong enough to make 
the conclusion of  my argument substantive. Many if  not most philosophers who previously 
leaned toward Humeanism about laws or expressed skepticism about the notion of  governance 
will agree that one ought not adopt a metaphysical theory if  it conflicts with our best scientific 
theories. So those very philosophers ought to think that the principles that constrain theory 
choice in physics constrain their own theory of  laws, and they cannot avoid the challenge posed 
by the pattern-explanation principle. Either they find a way of  arguing against the principle—
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which involves coming up with an alternative account of  the examples described in section 1. Or 
they find a way to accept the consequences discussed below.
But for those philosophers who are less committed in this regard, it is perhaps worth 
saying a bit more about the sort of  background picture that might motivate the consensus that 
our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by the content of  our best scientific theories. 
The most natural such background picture is one on which metaphysics and science have the 
same aim—to accurately describe objective reality—and use the same tools to pursue that aim, 
but to a different degree. Scientists focus primarily on questions which they suspect will turn on 
the collection of  complex empirical data, and for which the extra-empirical factors at play are 
relatively straightforward, whereas metaphysicians work primarily on questions where the 
relevant empirical data is widely accepted, but the extra-empirical factors are controversial. 
This sort of  background view nicely accounts for a number of  facts about the relationship 
between physics and metaphysics, including the fact that some debates that were once solely 
investigated by the latter later came under scrutiny from the former (e.g. the nature of  time), and 
the fact that there are many debates that seem to be informed by both physics and metaphysics 
(e.g. the question of  whether there is a fundamental level). It also has the straightforward 
consequence that the principles that constrain scientific theory choice should constrain 
metaphysical theory choice as well.13
4 What this tells us about laws of  nature
So the pattern-explanation principle constrains theory choice in physics. And given that it 
constrains theory choice in physics it ought to constrain theory choice in metaphysics as well. 
What does this tell us about laws of  nature? I claim that it shows that laws must govern. Here is 
why.
Suppose we are living in a Newtonian world. It is a law that f  = ma. In such a world, in 
every observation that we make, it is always the case that the net force on an object equals the 
mass times the acceleration. That is a well-established pattern. Here is a question that it is natural 
to have: what is the reason why that pattern occurs? What, in other words, explains that pattern, in 
a metaphysically robust sense of  explanation? A natural response to this question is to say that the 
reason why the pattern occurs is that it is a law that f  = ma. To endorse this response is to endorse 
the governing conception of  laws.
Newton’s second law as a governing law. The fact that it is a law that f  = ma is the 
13 The argument in this section is discussed in detail in Emery ms.
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reason why f  = ma in all observed cases.14 
According to the governing conception of  laws, laws are the reason why things happen the way 
that they do. They aren’t mere summaries of  events. Instead they explain those events, in a 
metaphysically robust sense. Let P be any well-established pattern. If  it is a law that P, then, 
according to the governing conception of  laws, the fact that it is a law that P is the reason why 
P.15
Now, there are many questions that one might have about the governing conception of  
laws. One might wonder, what is a law anyway? How can we be sure that it is the right kind of  
thing to play this explanatory role? What if  in order to play this explanatory role, laws have to be 
entities of  a sort that we would prefer not to allow into our metaphysics? What if  in order to play 
this explanatory role, laws are such that we cannot give any metaphysical analysis of  them at all? 
These are all good questions. We would like to be able to answer them in a satisfying way. 
But according to the pattern explanation principle, regardless of  whether and how we end up 
answering them, none of  these questions can give us a good reason for resisting the governing 
conception of  laws, at least not until we can come up with alternative explanations of  the 
patterns in the data that the laws are supposed to explain. One cannot, for instance, reject the 
governing conception of  laws in favor of  the following strategy:
The no-explanation strategy. There is no explanation for the fact that f  = ma in all 
observed cases.
Why not? Because this would violate the pattern explanation constraint. 
And note that not just any alternative explanation will suffice. In order to satisfy the 
pattern explanation constraint, one needs an alternative explanation that is metaphysically robust. 
One cannot, for instance, reject the governing conception of  laws in favor of:
The pattern subsumption strategy. The explanation of  the fact that f  = ma in all 
observed cases is that f  = ma in all cases.
As argued in section 3, pattern subsumption is not sufficient to satisfy the type of  explanation 
required by the pattern explanation principle. 
It may seem surprising that we can arrive at the conclusion that we should accept the 
governing conception of  laws without putting forward any account whatsoever about what laws 
14 It is worth noting that nothing important hinges on the ‘governing’ label. If  one has in mind a different notion of  
governance, one is welcome to use different terminology. All of  the consequences discussed in the next section will 
still follow.
15 More specifically, they determine patterns of  events. Do they do so directly? Or do they determine patterns of  
event by determining the individual instances that constitute those patterns? I don’t take a stand on this here.
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are. But it follows from the pattern-explanation principle that if  the only way to explain the 
pattern of  instances of  a law is by appealing to the law itself, then it doesn’t actually matter what 
sort of  entities laws are—it doesn’t matter how weird or novel they may turn out to be or how 
little we understand them—we can be sure nonetheless that they exist and that they provide 
metaphysically robust explanations of  patterns of  their instances. If  they did not, those patterns 
would go unexplained and the pattern-explanation principle would be violated.
Of  course, nothing that has been said so far forecloses the possibility of  giving a reductive, 
or at least an illuminating, metaphysical account of  laws. Surely everyone who is party to the 
debate should think that, all else being equal, such an account is preferable to an account that 
takes laws to be primitive or otherwise mysterious. The upshot of  the argument in this section is 
merely that even if it turns out that we can’t give a reductive or illuminating account of  laws, we 
still must accept their existence and we must still remain committed to at least one aspect of  the 
role that they play—that they provide metaphysically robust explanations of  patterns of  their 
instances.  Even if  laws strike us as just as surprising and strange as the neutrino struck Pauli, 
even if  we know as little about laws as Faraday knew about the electromagnetic field or 
contemporary cosmologists know about dark energy, we still have to accept laws—the kind of  
laws that can provide metaphysically robust explanations—into our metaphysics. To do otherwise 
would be to violate the pattern explanation principle. And that is not something that, as 
scientifically respectable metaphysicians, we ought to do.
5 The governing conception and Humeanism about laws
In the last section, I argued that laws must provide metaphysically robust explanations of  patterns 
of  their instances. In Beebee’s terms, I have argued for the governing conception of  laws. This 
argument did not rely on the idea that the governing conception is a conceptual truth. Instead it 
followed from a straightforward interpretation of  standard scientific practice combined with a 
straightforward understanding of  the relationship between science and metaphysics. On my view, 
this should be the starting point of  any metaphysics of  laws. 
This much, I think, is already substantive. But in this section, I will show how my 
argument bears on the familiar debate between Humeans and non-Humeans about laws. In 
particular, I will argue it makes it much more difficult to be a Humean about laws of  nature than 
one might previously have thought, and that it does so in a way that should be especially 
worrying to those Humeans who like to think of  themselves as naturalists—who take scientific 
theorizing to be a paradigm case of  successful inquiry into what the world is like. Those who are 
disinterested in the many iterations of  the Humean/non-Humean debate should feel free to skip 
to the next section. 
Why does my argument make it more difficult to be a Humean? Because it gives rise to an 
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especially difficult version of  the circularity challenge for Humeanism as raised by, e.g. Armstrong 
1983 and Maudlin 2007.16 Versions of  the circularity objection have been spelled out in great 
detail in the recent literature.17 Here is the version that is made salient by the argument above.
The defining feature of  Humean accounts of  laws is that laws are in some sense nothing 
over and above the Humean mosaic, where the Humean mosaic is the distribution of  categorical 
(non-nomic) properties throughout spacetime. It is natural to think that it follows from the fact 
that Humean laws are nothing over and above the mosaic that the following principle is true:
Mosaic to Laws. The reason why the laws are what they are is because the mosaic is 
what it is. 
In other words, the Humean mosaic provides a metaphysically robust explanation of  the laws.18 
But now notice that, given the argument above, we must also agree that the laws provide a 
metaphysically robust explanation of  at least part of  the mosaic—the part that corresponds to the 
pattern of  instances of  those laws. 
Laws to Mosaic. Part of  the reason why the mosaic is what it is is because the laws 
are what they are.
Perhaps there are some parts of  the mosaic (the unpatterned parts) that go without explanation 
or that have explanations that do not involve appeals to the laws. But there are also at least some 
parts of  the mosaic that, given the argument in section 5, are what they are because the laws are 
what they are. The mosaic of  a Newtonian world, for instance, consists of  many, many instances 
in which f  = ma. Why is that? As argued above, it must be because it is a law that f  = ma.
Thus we have an explanatory circle: the laws provide a metaphysically robust explanation 
of  part of  the mosaic and the mosaic provides a metaphysically robust explanation of  the laws. 
And this seems deeply problematic. If  A is the reason why B, B cannot be part of  the reason why 
A. At the very least, to accept such a circle is a serious theoretical cost.
What are the prospects for the Human in responding to the circularity challenge? First, 
they can try to insist that the circularity is not problematic. I won’t say anything more about the 
16 Beebee 2000 also claims that the governing conception of  laws is a key component of  the supervenience 
challenges raised by Carroll 1994, Tooley 1977, and Menzies 1993. I won’t discuss those challenges in detail here, 
but it is worth noting that if  Beebee is correct, then this is a second way in which the argument that I have presented 
for the governing conception of  laws will make it harder to be a Humean. One can no longer resist the 
supervenience objections by resisting the governing conception of  laws that (according to Beebee at least) underlies 
those objections.
17 In addition to Armstrong and Maudlin, see Lange 2013, Hicks and van Elswyck 2014, Miller 2015, Marshall 
2015, and Roski 2017.
18 If  you’re skeptical of  the idea that Humeanism should be understood in this way, note that I will say more about 
this assumption below.
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plausibility of  this move below. If  Humeans must take this route, that is surely a surprising and 
unintuitive cost. Second, they can try to avoid the circle. But notice that given my argument 
above, the Humean cannot avoid the circle by claiming that laws do not provide metaphysically 
robust explanations of  the mosaic. They must instead claim that laws are not in fact explained by 
the mosaic. More carefully, given my argument, they must claim that the mosaic is not the reason 
why the laws are what they are. And while the view that the mosaic is not the reason why the 
Humean laws are what they are is plausibly compatible with the view that the Humean laws 
supervene on the mosaic, it is a surprising view nonetheless. If, according to the Humean, the 
mosaic is not the reason why the laws are what they are, then why are the laws what they are? It is 
unclear how the Humean will answer this question. Third, and finally, the Humean can find 
some way of  avoiding my argument for the governing conception of  laws. Doing so will require 
either a surprising reinterpretation of  the examples that I gave in section 1, or a surprising claim 
about the relationship between science and metaphysics that is at odds with the view that I 
described in section 4.
One important thing to notice here is that this way of  presenting the circularity objection 
avoids disputes over whether Humeans should frame their account of  laws in terms of  
grounding. The recent trend, especially following Schaffer 2008, and Loewer 2012, has been to 
understand Humeanism as the view that laws are grounded in the Humean mosaic.19 As 
grounding talk started to seem like a promising way of  making sense of  “nothing over and 
above” locutions throughout metaphysics, it only made sense to apply it in this case as well. But 
recently some philosophers, including Miller 2015, have suggested that it may be a mistake to 
think of  Humean laws in this way.20 These philosophers sometimes suggest that the circularity 
objection may be avoided simply by returning to an account on which what it is to be a Humean 
about laws is merely to think that laws supervene on the mosaic. This move may be especially 
attractive to those who wish to stick close to the views of  the most famous proponent of  
Humeanism, David Lewis, as well as those with Humean inclinations who are skeptical of  
grounding claims in general.21
But what the argument above shows is that we can set discussions of  Lewis’s intentions 
and of  the plausibility of  grounding claims in general, and in this particular case, aside. 
Regardless of  how those discussions turn out, Humeans face a serious challenge to do with 
19 Beebee 2000 also includes grounding locutions although it is unclear whether ultimately she thinks that the 
Humean is committed to thinking that laws are grounded in the mosaic. 
20 See also Hall ms and Kovacs ms. It may be that a non-trivial proportion of  metaphysicians interested in laws never 
endorsed the shift to grounding-talk to begin with. Consider, for instance, the SEP article on laws of  nature, 
authored by John Carroll (2016) which exclusively presents the Humean view in terms of  supervenience, and makes 
no mention of  grounding. 
21 Although Lewis occasionally used language suggesting that the Humean was committed to some kind of  
reduction, he may have thought that in some cases asymmetric supervenience—such as the asymmetric 
supervenience of  Humean laws on the Humean mosaic—was itself  sufficient for reduction. The discussion in Miller 
2015, especially footnote 8 is helpful here.
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explanatory circularity. Either they say that the mosaic is the reason why the laws are what they 
are, in which case circularity threatens. Or they say that the mosaic is not the reason why the laws 
are what they are, in which case they face the question: why are the laws what they are? Unless 
they have some way of  answering this question, or some way of  convincing us that it need not be 
answered, we ought not be Humeans.
6 What is governance?
In sections 1 through 4 of  this paper I argued that laws govern in the following sense: if  P is some 
well-established pattern and it is a law that P, then the fact that it is a law that P is the reason why 
P.22 
The fact that laws provide metaphysically robust explanations in this way is, on my view, 
the core of  the idea that laws govern. But I’m sympathetic to the idea that we should at least 
attempt to provide a further account of  the governance relation, and indeed I think that the 
argument above suggests several options for such an account. 
Start from the fact that the key feature of  governance is that the governing relation 
supports metaphysically robust explanatory relations. One way of  putting this is that the 
governing relation is a dependence relation, where a dependence relation is just a relation that 
supports metaphysically robust explanation. As noted above, two other paradigm examples of  
dependence relations are causation and grounding. A relatively natural move, then, would be to 
build an account of  governance on these other, already widely accepted, dependence relations. 
There are three ways of  doing this. 
The first two ways of  building an account of  governance on already widely-accepted 
dependence relations are obvious: we could simply say that governance is just a type of  causation 
or we could say that governance is just a type of  grounding.
Governance as Causation. To endorse a governing account of  laws is to say that the 
fact that it is a law that P is the reason why P in the sense that the fact that it is a 
law that P causes P.
Governance as Grounding. To endorse a governing account of  laws is to say that the 
fact that it is a law that P is the reason why P in the sense that the fact that it is a 
law that P grounds P. 
22 As noted above, this claim explicitly leaves open whether the governance relation holds directly between the fact 
that it is a law that P and P, or  whether the governance relation instead holds between the fact that it is a law that P 
and individual instances of  P, where the combined individual instances of  P are then are the reason why P.
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The obvious advantage of  endorsing one of  these accounts is that many of  us are already 
committed to causation and grounding and to the idea that causation and grounding support 
metaphysically robust explanations. So if  governance just is a type of  causation or if  governance 
just is a type of  grounding then many of  us aren’t adding anything new to our metaphysics, and 
the fact that it governance supports metaphysically robust explanations isn’t especially surprising.
But both of  these accounts also have a downside: they will require revising widely held 
beliefs about what causation or grounding consist in. Consider first Governance as Causation. 
Causation is widely held to be a relation that holds between events, but governance is a relation 
that takes, as one of  its relata a fact about laws. Facts about laws are not events.23 So if  we 
endorse Governance as Causation, then we have to give up a widely held belief  about 
causation.24
The same will be true of  Governance as Grounding, although this may not be as 
immediately obvious. To see why, consider the fact that grounding is widely held to be 
metaphysically necessitating in the sense that if  F grounds G then any metaphysically possible 
world where F occurs is also a world in which G also occurs. But we shouldn’t accept any view of  
governance that requires governance to be metaphysically necessitating in this sense; many laws, 
including some of  our current best candidates for the fundamental dynamical laws, are 
indeterministic, and the relation between such laws and their instances (or between such laws and 
patterns of  those instances) is not metaphysically necessitating. Indeed it is not even 
nomologically necessitating.
Suppose you take a bunch of  silver atoms and send them through a set of  magnets that 
creates an inhomogeneous magnetic field (a magnetic field that is stronger in one direction than 
another). The field will deflect some of  the silver atoms in one direction—call it up—and the rest 
of  the magnets in another direction—call it down. Suppose you then take all and only the silver 
atoms that were deflected up through the first set of  magnets and send them through a second set 
of  magnets, which is rotated slightly with respect to the first. The vast majority of  the atoms will 
go up again through the second set of  magnets. Call this pattern P-M. 
According to several of  our current best candidate theories of  quantum mechanical 
phenomena, the only available explanation for P-M is the fact that the fundamental laws assign 
an very high objective probability to each silver atom going up through the second set of  magnets 
given that it went up through the first set of  magnets. Call the laws that assign these objective 
probabilities L-M. According to the pattern explanation principle, then, we have to accept the 
23 See Paul and Hall 2013 and Schaffer 2016b.
24 Someone who wanted to endorse Governance as Causation might point out that in principle at least it is easy to 
translate between facts and events—for every fact there is the event of  that fact obtaining. One thing to note, 
however, is that if  there is such a thing as the event of  the fact that it is a law that P obtaining, then that event is not 
spatiotemporally localized, which makes it importantly different from most paradigm examples of  events that stand 
in causal relations. In any case, note that if  you think there is no issue here for taking governance to be causation, 
then that is all to the good as far as my argument is concerned. 
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view that the fact that it is a law that L-M is the reason why P-M. But notice that on any standard 
view about objective probability, there are metaphysically, and even nomologically possible worlds 
in which L-M obtains, but P-M does not. These are worlds in which although the objective 
probability of  each silver atom going up through the second set of  magnets (given that it went up 
through the first set of  magnets) is very high, but in fact many or even all of  the silver atom end 
up being deflected down through the second set of  magnets instead. Such worlds are not very 
likely, but they are nomologically possible. 
What this example shows is that the pattern explanation principle will require a governing 
account of  both deterministic and indeterministic laws.25 As such, and given the fact that some 
of  our best candidates for the fundamental dynamical laws are indeterministic, one should allow 
that the governing relation itself  is not necessitating. And insofar as one thinks that governance is 
grounding, one should therefore think that grounding, contrary to widespread belief, is not 
necessitating either. Many philosophers, especially those steeped in the contemporary literature 
on grounding, will find the idea that grounding is not even nomologically necessitating to be 
difficult to accept.26
So to say that governance just is causation or just is grounding comes with costs. Are those 
costs worth paying? I don’t want to take a stand on that here.27 Instead, I want to emphasize that 
for those unwilling to pay the costs, there is a third way to proceed: to take governance to be a 
distinct member of  the family of  dependence relations that also includes causation and 
grounding. On this view, governance cannot be analyzed in terms of  causation or grounding; 
instead it is a novel type of  dependence relation.
This view is especially plausible when one realizes that the key features of  governance 
relations that might in one context seem worrying are also features that it has in common either 
causation or grounding. Consider, for instance, the fact that governance relations are not 
necessitating. This might be a reason for thinking that governance is not grounding, but it can’t 
be a reason for thinking that governance is not a member of  the family of  dependence relations. 
After all we (or most of  us, at least) have already accepted a dependence relation that isn’t 
necessitating—causation. It is widely accepted that F can cause G even if  F doesn’t necessitate G.
Or consider the fact that governance relations don’t hold between events.  This might be 
a reason for thinking that governance is not causation, but it can’t be a reason for thinking that 
governance is not a member of  the family of  dependence relations. After all we (or most of  us, at 
least) have already accepted a dependence relation that doesn’t hold between events—grounding. 
25 The argument above follows Emery 2017.
26 One reason to be especially adamant about holding the line here is if  you endorse the view the causation and 
grounding are very similar and one of  the only important differences between the two is that the latter is 
necessitating, while the former is not. See Schaffer 2016a.
27 In Emery 2017 I argued for Governance as Grounding, because I thought that Governance as Causation was 
more costly. Today I am more inclined toward the third view described below, on which governance is a novel 
dependence relation.
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It is widely accepted the grounding relation need not take events as relata.28
Taking governance to be a novel dependence relation has the advantage that we need not 
revise any widely accepted views about causation or grounding. The cost of  this view, obviously, is 
that it involves introducing a novel dependence relation into our metaphysics. All else being 
equal, we should avoid introducing novel relations into our metaphysics if  we can. That said, it is 
worth emphasizing that there is an important difference between saying that grounding is a novel 
dependence relation, and saying that grounding is a primitive dependence relation. Nothing in 
what I have said here requires that those who take this third option accept that grounding is 
unanalyzable. The key feature of  this approach, rather, is that governance is not analyzed in 
terms of  causation or grounding—that is what makes it novel. 
Those are three ways of  developing a further account of  grounding that builds on already 
widely-accepted dependence relations. I am not here advocating any one of  these views over the 
others, and in principle, at least, I am open to other options. The key feature of  governance that 
follows from my argument is just that governance is a dependence relation in the following sense: 
it supports metaphysically robust explanations. The discussion in this section is supposed to 
illustrate that there are several ways of  further fleshing out the notion of  governance in a way 
that is compatible with this claim.
Of  course, all three of  the options I set out above come with costs. But here is a position 
that is not viable, given the argument of  this paper: one cannot simply refuse to accept a 
governing account of  laws because one does not want to pay these costs. To see why, return to 
some of  the examples presented in section 1. Consider, for instance, the introduction of  dark 
energy to explain the accelerating rate of  expansion of  the universe. Scientists have little idea 
what dark energy is. So of  course they can have no guarantee that the way in which dark energy 
explains the accelerating rate of  expansion of  the universe will be cost-free. Perhaps the only way 
for dark energy to play the relevant explanatory role will require either revising accepted 
explanatory relations or even introducing a novel kind of  explanatory relation.29 Hopefully that 
doesn’t turn out to be the case, but the fact that it might doesn’t prevent scientists from thinking 
that dark energy exists. Why not? Because they need there to be something to explain accelerating 
rate of  expansion of  the universe. Otherwise they would violate the pattern explanation 
principle.
28 What exactly the grounding relation does take as relata is up for debate. Some philosophers (e.g. Shaffer 2009) are 
ecumenicists about this and think that grounding relations can hold between a wide range of  relata. Other 
philosophers (e.g. Rosen 2010 or Audi 2012) insist that grounding relations only hold between facts. I know of  no 
one who thinks that grounding holds only between events.
29 In conversation, I sometimes have heard the following response to this line of  reasoning, “but we at least know 
something about how dark energy explains—it explains in the way that energy in general explains.” My view is that 
give the wide range of  possibilities for what dark energy is, the claim that dark energy explains in the way that energy 
explains is far more complicated to evaluate than it first appears. Moreover, a defender of  a governing account of  
laws can also point out that in a similar way, we know something about the way in which laws explain—they do so by 
providing reasons why, just like other less controversial, dependence relations like causation and grounding do.
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The same sort of  attitude should be adopted in the case of  laws. We need governing laws 
in order to explain patterns in the data. It may be that the way in which governing laws provide 
these explanations comes with costs. That is perhaps unfortunate, but it isn’t a reason not to 
accept the governing conception of  laws—at least not unless one has some alternative 
explanation available. 
Conclusion
The governing conception of  laws is the view that laws explain patterns of  their instances in a 
metaphysically robust way. The reason why (in a Newtonian world) net force is always equal to 
mass times acceleration is that it is a law that net force is equal to mass times acceleration. This 
fact is not a conceptual truth about laws, but it is a fact—and one that everyone should accept. 
For the governing conception of  laws follows from a important principle of  scientific theory 
choice and the principles of  scientific theory choice should also constrain metaphysical 
theorizing.
If  follows from this argument that, in general, when we are doing scientifically-informed 
metaphysics we ought to pay attention to the principles of  scientific practice as well as to the 
content of  our best scientific theories, and insofar as we do so we should be less concerned with 
our metaphysical scruples regarding certain kinds of  entities, and more concerned with the 
extent to which our metaphysical theories provide adequate explanations. In the particular case 
of  laws, we should be resist being moved, as many prominent Humeans are, by the worry that 
non-Humean accounts will require “metaphysically heavy-duty and suspect entities”.30 Or at 
least, we should resist being moved by such worries unless we are confident that laws that don’t 
require such entities can play the explanatory role required of  them. In this way, my argument 
reinvigorates serious issues for Humeanism about laws of  nature. 
The argument also opens up several relatively straightforward ways of  understanding the 
governance relation by drawing on other, already widely-accepted relations that underwrite 
metaphysically robust explanations. Governance might be understood as a type of  causation, for 
instance. Or it might be understood as a type of  grounding. Or governance might be a novel 
dependence relation, a member of  the same family as causation and grounding, but distinct from 
each.
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